Comparative Modern Societies:
Politics and Society in 20th Century Germany

by Merve ARABACI

Summary and Interpretation of Poland by Michael C. Steinlauf In the “Poland” partition of his book The World Reacts to the Holocaust, Michael C. Steinlauf discusses the constituents of the continuation of anti-Semitism from prewar Poland to postwar Poland in a way unlike in other parts of Europe where anti-Semitism would most definitely be associated with collaborating with the Nazis. In explaining Poland’s process of coping with the memory of the Holocaust, he goes into thorough detail of the effects of communist rule and how it led to the Poles to brush the Holocaust out of their collective memory for a while, because maintaining national honor was a necessary defense mechanism in the face of danger from the Soviet Union. The Holocaust’s memory was only able to begin resurfacing in the late 1970s when communist restrictions began to relax.

We must first look at Jewish-Polish relations particularly before and during war years that shaped and sculpted the readiness of Poland for the postwar political mess, bearing in mind the resentments and misunderstandings along with the severity of the sufferings of both sides during the Holocaust to understand important constituents. The article begins by examining the pre-Holocaust history of the Jewish community in Poland during which the Jews enjoyed unprecedented liberties with considerable autonomy in the administration of their affairs during the Middle Ages, at a time when they were suffering persecution in the rest of Europe. Key settlements took place during the fourteenth and fifteenth

centuries when thousands of Jews were driven eastward due to persecution in northeastern France and Germany.  The Polish Commonwealth during these

years was a remarkable composition of ethnic/religious diversity with multiple centers of authority with comparative stability. Steinlauf states that such openness though in reality a necessity for survival, is often cited as a principle of modern Polish self-perception, “the conviction that Poles are at heart a very tolerant people.” (Steinlauf, 83). He explores the limits of this tolerance (we must note that tolerance often has a condescending connotation) and the irony of the term coined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries “Poland, paradise of the Jews” throughout his paper.

The Commonwealth’s praised tolerance was going to become its Achilles’ heel, a source of its decentralization, internal plotting and betrayal that led to the inevitable disintegration of royal authority and instability. By the end of the eighteenth century this process of decomposition caused the disappearance of Poland as a political entity, a prey to its three newly powerful neighbors-Prussia, Austria, and Russia

where its national consciousness struggled for survival and attained it above all in the church. Steinlauf describes the conditions for Jews in the three partitions of Poland under three empires during the years 1795 to 1918 and the changes within the Jewish population such as the Haskala, or The Jewish enlightenment. The movement of secular Jews away from the “backward East” brought them in closer contact with non-Jewish languages and Polish struggles for freedom where the legendary figure Berek Joselewicz would come to symbolize Polish-Jewish cooperation for generations to come.

During this crucial time for the Polish national identity, despite the procured narrative of Poles as the vanguards of a universal struggle for freedom, the Polish tolerance for Jews would only yield sympathy as long as the Jews were perceived as allies of the Polish cause. In the nineteenth century Poles’ struggle with capitalism led to hostility towards Jews, especially the rising Jewish banker or industrialist.

Supplemented by the Jewish National movement in the 1880s and the rapid over turning of the feudal order, a change in Polish perception of Jews took place, with familiar stereotypes of the Jews being swept away as Jews in Prussia and Russia were manipulated against the Poles. Now with assimilation outmoded and a new personal assertiveness among younger Jews, the old comical zydki, or wise old patriarchs were replaced by an unknown frightening personage accompanied by the threat of an independent Jewish politics, arousing a fear of a Jewish state on Polish soil with the notion of Jews as a “state with in a state.”

The effects of these factors compounded to a debate over Polish national identity which in short can be summarized as a struggle of the notion of a nationalities state versus a nation state, pluralists versus exclusivists, and Polish Socialist Party versus National Democratic Party corresponding respectfully. Even within a frame of Polish and universal ideals, the Polish Socialist Party founded in 1897, welcomed Jews who considered themselves Polish patriots. The underlying tone and foremost struggle, however, permeates in the political focus of the National Democratic party founded in the late 1890s with not only an exclusion of those not ethnically of Polish descent, but also and especially with the exclusion of those not of the Roman Catholic faith.

The conservation of national identity often incites a nation to instill a hierarchy of nationalities in its rhetoric to its people, especially when under the threat of another outside power over economic and political prominence. For example, parallel to Poland’s case in many ways, the southern European immigration wave in the United States incited the same fears as these masses were seen as difficult to assimilate, and before them the Irish immigrants incurred much discrimination for economic reasons when they were embraced at first for their common struggle for freedom. Although this defense mechanism should not to be justified, we have seen this through out history with many countries other than Poland. I think that to an extent, social Darwinism, and Endeks’ argument that “a modern national existence [demands] a “national egoism” in the merciless struggle for survival against other peoples” often plays a substantial role in the psychology of a nation. (Steinlauf, 89). Steinlauf also points our attention to this difference in Polish anti-Semitism, and in doing so I do not think that he is excusing it, but communicating that we must

acknowledge the grays among the black and white. He explains the psychology of a Poland which felt divided and betrayed then in a world filled with enemies and false friends and feels unrecognized and alone now; through this portrayal it is easy to predict that the exclusivist narrative would surmount the pluralist narrative for quite a while in Polish history which became a prey to either paranoia or empty posturing.

Lastly before moving onto the Polish reaction to the Holocaust, Steinlauf describes Jewish-Polish relations during 1918 and 1939. With a reconstituted country out of the destitution of the war, Poland faced many problems, including an economic crisis, an agriculture in crisis, a growing mass of impoverished landless peasants, political intrigue stirred by the minorities and powerful neighbors, and a population that was only 2/3 ethnically Polish. The rising hostility to non-Poles continued, with the influence of the ethnically based notion of nationality surmounting Poland’s proclaimed name as the Second Commonwealth. With the Minority Treaty after the Paris Peace Conference, the Jews were increasingly using the notion of Jewish nationality to define themselves as they grew in political influence ranging from right to left with some most successful being: the General Zionists, anti-Zionist Agudat Israel, and the anti-Zionist Bund. With their little gain of power, the Jews were seen as a political threat, convicted of aiding the other side and being pro-Soviet. Just as the US did to the Japanese during the second world war (in fact on a larger case), during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-20 the Poles declared a group of Jewish army officers a security risk and forced them to intern in a detention camp and in turn faced a heated international outcry for their treatment of Jews.  Before the Holocaust even began, the Poles were inimical towards the Jews, alleged to have ruined Poland’s international integrity, and despite Endek’s aversion to Germany, some youths openly emulated the Nazis. In a Poland exasperated by the economic catastrophe of the 1930s, which led to much social conflict, Jews, despite condemnations of anti-Semitic violence by the church, incurred discrimination and were already being spurned and harassed before Germany invaded Poland in 1939.

During the Holocaust years, however, the Polish population underwent much demoralization. With their elites wiped out, most cultural activities banned, education” limited to the fourth grade, entertainment to operettas, cabarets, and pornography,” drinking encouraged, crime and corruption incited, smugglers praised as heroic figures, and money a measure of all things, the Polish society’s traditional values were wrecked and degenerated by the Nazis. (Steinlauf, 97). How valid was the clarity that the Poles at the time knew that some of them were to be

preserved for enslavement, or that they were not under a danger of suffering from the same fate of Jews, I think can be debated, but the fact that as a result the Jews suffered in grander proportions and under gorier conditions is a fact that must not be overlooked. Though some righteous gentile saved the Jews from Nazi hands, and some exacerbated their chances of survival, the author clearly states that Poles were the most relentlessly victimized national group after the Jews and were nearly powerless to act in the face of Nazi aggression. In comparison to the Jews, despoiled of their possessions and sealed into ghettos, however, the Poles at least had access to large financial resources channeled from London, and a black market that rarely allowed their hunger to develop into starvation.

The Polish response varied from altruism to active participation in the killing, but also variation existed among collective response to individual response.  For some they collaborated with Jewish resistance groups, some traded Jews in for economic returns, some died after risking their lives and the lives of their families to protect Jews in their homes and some were relieved that their economic opponent was being eliminated, reminiscent of the pre-war anti-Semitic demands. During and after the war, anti-Semitic sentiments remained embedded in Polish society. Jews were again accused of political betrayal as supporters of the Bolsheviks and masterminds of Polish Communism, especially when anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union was forbidden. Steinlauf also states that American and British Jews found denouncing Polish anti-Semitism easier “than criticizing their own governments’ inaction in saving Jews.” (Steinlauf, 105). The Polish underground and the government in exile both responded to the mass slaughter in outrage, but according to the press the “fate of the Jews was a distant second to the fate of the Poles.” (Steinlauf, 105).

I think it is important to observe the actual state of the knowledge pool among the general population; just as those Jews who tried to warn the others of the gas chambers waiting for them were not believed, it is also easy for the Polish mass to not have been able to imagine the extent of the misery of the Jews when they were also living under fear and oppression. We must also understand more fully the underground Polish efforts to aid Jews like that of Zegota’s, and what implications did these serve for the Polish international image, along with the extent to

which both sides hated, or feared each other, Jews and Poles. Despite the presence of the same type of fears among the Poles through out the Holocaust as well as before, there are records of numerous Polish individuals reaching out to Jews. We must acknowledge that “hiding Jews required a powerful system of personal values independent of social norms.” (Steinlauf, 107).

We must equally acknowledge, however, the use of propaganda to gain political legitimacy whether wrong or right, altering historical data or inflating figures, on the other hand is something that should not be excused during the Post-Holocaust era. Steinlauf makes a valid point that often in the postwar years during the Polish discourse on the Holocaust, what counted was not what was said but rather who said it and what forces they represented. The Polish government had fallen subservient to Moscow and for a while ruled by provisional governments; therefore, the preconditions for Communism in Poland was not the same as in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and as a result, the a degree of sympathy in Polish society towards the reforms promised by Communist leaders during the immediate postwar years did not last very long. A general atmosphere of demoralization persisted in a Poland that felt betrayed by the West and found itself in a battle against Communism imposed by the eastern enemy.

Despite the new Polish Government’s legitimization of itself as against anti-Semitism, for the sake of national identity and the integrity of the collective memory the criticisms that the world was honoring Jews but consigning the Polish national struggle into the dustbin of history soon arose. (Steinlauf, 111).

The enemy constituted a mirror image of government propaganda identified by labels of “alien,” “Communist,” “Jewish,” and “traitorous.” In such a politically sensitive time, it was unfortunate that it became easy to instigate many convictions against the Jews, in one case which the author sarcastically notes in his writing “thus the Jews became responsible for the enslavement of Poland.” (Steinlauf, 112). The notorious anti-Semitic violence that arose as a result of these convictions legitimated the government’s claim to being the only force that could protect the Jews. It is a valid point to keep asking why Anti-Semitism, and the presence of postwar fascist bandits continued in such a way after Poland’s witnessing

the Holocaust. I agree with Steinlauf that in addition to the characteristically economic factors that anti-Semitism encompassed in pre-war Poland, the postwar situation was essentially a political one; and yet anti-Semitism in Poland was not comparable to that in the Soviet Union. (Steinlauf, 115).

Though during the years between 1948-1968, much evidence on Polish reaction is not available, the Polish population was still under “nationalistic, chauvinistic, and racist views [propagated by] comrades holding responsible party or state positions.” (Steinlauf, 116). I think that mob mentality is an important factor and the leaders of the mob control the mobilization’s direction. During this struggle of developing

Polish identity, and legitimizing rulers’ powers, the memory of the Holocaust incurred much “Polonization,” and abuse that the author proclaims unjust, whether this be in pamphlets or speeches of the rhetoric of the Holocaust that dilutes the Jews into categories such as “and other nationalities.” The author also criticizes that during the Post-war discourse this “genocide” of the Jews was seen often as a result the passiveness of Jews. I also, find this interesting, as the first section at the entrance of the museum of Galicia was constructed to tell about those who resisted and fought against the Holocaust. I do, however think that, while the suffering of the Poles cannot be raised to an equal level to that of the Jews, their suffering must not be forgotten by the international community, as I feel is done during the teaching of the Holocaust, especially by secondary schools.

In a discourse on the bystanders and witnesses of history, we must also observe the passivity of other nations that waited for the Nazis and the Soviets to finish each other off on the eastern front before they intervened in some way. Even so, I think that the discourse that needs to take place now is not about the world’s reaction to the Holocaust during the Holocaust, but the reaction after the Holocaust; we must carefully separate between political needs and political propaganda and exaggerations. I equally disagree with the Poles’ need to allude to the

Holocaust as a mass suffering of the Poles and their struggles of martyrdom, in their efforts to incorporate this event into their national memory without a proportionally just mention of the Jews. We must also keep in mind the political role of the figures that instigate such sentiments, as the years 1968-70 witness a state-sponsored campaign of anti-Semitic movement denouncing Zionism and leading to the forced expulsion of jobless Jews. The campaign directly spoke to the Polish people and their nationalistic fervors in creating an acceptable narrative

of the war years. The population was swept by the ideological base of Moczar and the Endo-Communists and the Partisans, reincarnation of the Polish anti-Nazi underground campaign in the name of all “fighting Poles” against a foe that sought Poland’s humiliation and defeat, claiming the existence of an international plot overseen by the American imperialists and implemented by the Germans and The Jews. (Steinlauf, 122). 

The history written during this time no longer pertains to an internationalist perspective, and was censored in many ways till the 1980s. With his list of the revisions of the accounts of the war years and the plethora of anti-Polish conspiracies proclaimed in newly written books, Steinlauf nearly entertains the reader with his bitterness around this “exorcism of the worst demons of the Polish national memory”, especially noting his sentence “ the real victims were clearly the Poles.” (Steinlauf, 125).

It seems, however, that those small periods, which give hope for the defeat of chauvinism by pluralism last short as economic crisis follow very shortly, as can be seen during Edward Gierek’s rise to power, a period of international legitimacy and a liberal image to the West, followed by the 1973 Oil crisis. During this time important realization for the political factions of Poland was taking place: the church and the secular intelligentsia were gradually realizing that they had a great deal in common in their fight against the effects of sovietization, firstly

being the destruction of Polish tradition by a replacement of a “castrated” history whose only function was to legitimize the existing order. This period during the 1970s, though it was a period of universal silence on the Jewish Question, was important for Poland to regain its peoples’ solidarity with the system and through rehumanizing activities promote love and pluralism. (Steinlauf, 127).

During transition from this period, signs of an entirely new approach to the Jewish Question, with the collaboration of the Catholic intelligentsia undertaking the discussion of many taboo issues and the postwar assimilated Jewish population were appearing, leading Poland into a period of pluralist ideas in the 1980s.

Until the 1980s before the fall of communism, however, I do not think that it was easy for Poland to come to terms with its own history in a healthy fashion. As we can see the conditions prepared for serious discussions of the Holocaust were really only available during the 1990s. The Polish national conscience, I think could only be appeased by a moral and acceptable mold of ideology suitable for the integrity of its collective memory, as it would like to see itself once again as the “Christ of nations.” The arrival of Pope John Paul II, helped permeate this impression, and within the nine days of his presence Poles were transformed, with the echoing messages of human rights, human dignity marking a new era in the Catholic Church’s relationship to the memory of the Holocaust, weakening the exclusivists’ exclusion of those not of the Roman Catholic faith by linking the two peoples with Abraham. With the start of an important dialogue between the two religions, unity prevailed and though commemorating martyrdom, as I have stated before became inevitable for the integrity of the Polish nation’s integrity, solidarity

now encompassed truth-telling in place of the political propaganda abused and employed for the ends of disparate political parties.

Despite the economic crisis in 1981 that imposed a pause with the proclamation of martial law till 1983, growing interest in the Jews, who had now become less of a “they” with the linkage of the religions through Abraham, did not stop. Jews were slowly becoming fashionable with their food, music and media. Rumors about Jewish origins of the solidarity leaders were started, and Poland still a prey to the problem of opportunism, with its government hungry for international legitimacy and economic aid staged a commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. The

intertwining of such commemorations of the Holocaust and the competition to appropriate the meaning of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in the 1988, presents support to the idea that this trend is inevitable politically as from Jan Jozef Lipski argument we can imply that victimization is an important part of the struggle for Polish patriotism. (Steinlauf, 136).

Steinlauf very effectively illustrates also how religion can be abused to justify the indifference to the death of the Jews in his account of a scene in the French film Shoah. Though France should not be excused from its own historical mistakes, I think that this one particular scene is an effective way of demonstrating the faulty logic that religion can sometimes encourage, though it can also be used as a positive means of mobilizing a population; this is not to say, however, that such political impressions should not be justly balanced with accounts of Polish struggles to help the Jews.

Asking the question; so why, 40 years after the Holocaust, did it become possible for Poles to begin mourning for the Jews, to rediscover Jewish remnants and commemorate the Jewish communities that once thrived amongst them only brings me to the conclusion that the Poles needed time to recover from economic destitution of war and the political chaos that the division and the threatening communist forces presented to be able to move on without feeling like their existence, their traditions and beliefs were not under risk. Same type of propaganda, of creating the paralyzing idea of “the other” was imposed on the citizens of the United States during the Cold War. The mobilization of the workers along with the secular intelligentsia and the moral support of the Catholic Church were necessary to coat the moral consciousness of a society seeking for an acceptable account of the war years to adopt into its national memory.  As the system in Poland regains its balance anti-Semitic sentiments will dwindle.

Steinlauf, however and justly so, leaves on a note of caution about the confrontation of Poles with the past of anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust which continued through out the 1980s and 1990s, as long as we have leaders who fight over representation through the implantation of a cross at Auschwitz or leaders who make statements like that of Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir that Poles “suck [anti-Semitism] in with their mother’s milk.” (Steinlauf, 141).

29.04.2008, Study Abroad Program, Course: Professor Martin Jander, Germany