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EVERYTHING
SHOULD BE UNDER THE SUN |
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We have
only one WORLD yet! If we destroy it, where else can we go to? - 7th issue - Fall 2001 |
Direct
Actions
A
Perspective on Afghanistan
"This
is interesting. I can't vouch for him having been in Afghanistan or
at West Point, but what he wrote does make sense, even based just on
what is by now public knowledge about the region and people there.
The author
ostensibly worked for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan.
That program was the largest civilian employer in the country
with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO. Another interesting
statistics about Afghanistan. ------- Forwarded
Message Follows ------- KNOWING YOUR ENEMY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT KEY TO WAR. THIS LETTER WAS WRITTEN BY A VERY BRIGHT AND AFGHANISTAN STREET-SMART WEST POINT GRAD TO HIS CLASSMATES. HE KNOWS THE TERRAIN, THE ENEMY, AND THE WEATHER IN AFGHANISTAN FROM BEING THERE, NOT FROM BOOKS. BURN HIS WORDS AND ADVICE INTO YOUR BRAINS. WE'LL WIN -- IF WE ALL HANG IN THERE UNTIL IT'S OVER OVER THERE.
HACK Classmates:
Many of you
are probably not aware that I was one of the last American citizens
to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first there in 1993, providing relief
and assistance to refugees along the Tajik border, and in this capacity
have traveled all along the border region between the two countries.
In 1998 and 1999, I was the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is the largest civilian employer in the country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO. In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in
a "Holy War," as decreed by the Taliban, against the evil
of landmines; and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those
who might have died in this effort were considered to be "martyrs"
-- even an "infidel" like myself.
The mine
action program is the most respected relief effort in the country, and
because of this I had the opportunity to travel extensively without
too much interference or restriction. I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan
community and read a great deal on the subject.
I had wanted
to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but quite frankly,
I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have not had
time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments
were excellent and I would like to use them as a basis for sharing some
observations.
First, he
is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and character. I want to touch on that later, but first
I want to share some comments about our "enemy."
Our enemy
is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated beyond what
most of us can imagine. The
vast majority of the people live day-to-day, hand-to-mouth in abject
conditions of poverty, misery and deprivation.
Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even less. The
country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like peace. They
know very little of the world at large, and have no access to information
or knowledge that would
counter what they are being told by the Taliban. They have nothing left,
nothing that is except for their pride.
Who is our
enemy? Well, our enemy
is a group of non-Afghans, often referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs"
and a fanatical group of religious leaders and their military cohort,
the Taliban. The non-Afghan
contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war
against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with
assistance by our own government.
OBL (as Osama
bin Laden was referred to by us in the country at the time) restored
this network to bring in more fighters, this time to support the Taliban
in their civil war against the former Mujehdeen. Over time, this military support along
with financial support has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to
co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is the "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces;
his bodyguards protect senior Talib leaders and he has built a system
of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed to withstand cruise
missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do that?). His forces basically rule the southern
city of Kandahar.
This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the local Afghans. At the same time, the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have become even harsher. It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for their forces and have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action, were probably on their way to sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan -- defeat and dismemberment. During the Afghan war with the Soviets, much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time, and most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the Soviets. Those concepts
were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never conquered as
a nation, are not invincible in battle.
A "good" Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of noise
and light. Basic military
skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that no matter
what, a warrior should never lose his honor.
Indeed, firing from the prone is considered
distasteful (but still done).
Traditionally,
the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters owing
allegiance to a "commander," and this person owing allegiance
upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed
this somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban army are there because
they are being paid to be there.
All such groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal
lines.
Again, the
concept of having a place of "honor" and "respect"
is of paramount importance and blood feuds between families and tribes
can last for generations over a perceived or actual slight.
That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting
the Russians. It is a very difficult task to form and
keep united a large bunch of Afghans into a military
formation. The "real"
stories that have come out of the war against the Soviets are very enlightening
and a lot different from our fantastic visions as cadets.
When the
first batch of Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen group,
another group -- supposedly on the same side -- attacked the first group
and stole the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use them,
but because having them was a matter of prestige.
Many larger
coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the
various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such
as blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in
order to seek glory.
In comparison
to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities were
lower for all involved.
As you can
tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not THAT good
in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less
so than the Afghans. So
why is it that they have never been conquered? It goes back to Dr. Kern's point about
will.
During their
history, the only events that have managed to form any semblance of
unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders.
And in doing this, the Afghans have been fanatical.
The Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to endure
hardships that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and enervate
the resolve of all
but the most elite military units.
The physical
difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather, and
the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their advantage
and use well. (NOTE: For
you military planner types and armchair generals: around November 1st,
most road movement is impossible, in part because all the roads used
by the Russians have been destroyed and air movement will be problematic
at best). Also, those fighting
us are not afraid to
fight. OBL and others do
not think the US has the will or the stomach for a fight.
Indeed after the absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the
overwhelming consensus was that we were cowards who would not risk one
life in face-to-face combat.
Rather than
demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that action and others
of the not so recent past, have reinforced the perception that the US
does not have any "will" and that we are morally and spiritually
corrupt.
Our challenge
is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their propensity
for internal struggles, the distrust between the extremists/Arabs and
the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to fight coordinated
battles, and their lack of external support. More importantly
through is that we have to take steps not to play to their strengths,
which would be to unite the entire population against us by increasing
their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down trying to hold
terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up and down mountain
valleys.
I have been
asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and well beyond
my pay grade or expertise. And
while I do not want to second guess current plans or start an academic
debate, I would share the following from what I know about Afghanistan
and the Afghans.
First, I
would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can
buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this cash, I would pay
some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership, making it look like
an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing discord. Third I would support the Northern alliance with military assets,
but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine its
legitimacy in the eyes
of most Afghans.
Fourth would
be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the
Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give
these guys a reason to live rather than the choice between dying of
starvation or dying fighting the "infidel." Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of
the country not under Taliban control (these are much more than the
press reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and
that improvements come with peace. Sixth, I would consider very carefully
putting any female service members into Afghanistan proper -- sorry
to the females of our class but within that culture a man who allows
a women to fight for him has zero respect, and we will need respect
to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies.
No Afghan will work with a man who fights with women.
I would hold
off from doing anything too dramatic in the new term, keeping a low
level of covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this
pressure to force open the fissions around the Taliban that were already
developing -- expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on
OBL.
We can pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after.
While I would
never want to advocate American causalities, it is essential that we
communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can and will "engage
and destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned above, we should not try
to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry operations against the enemy are
essential. There can be
no excuses after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our
enemies regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate
this except for ground combat.
And once
this is all over, unlike in 1989, the US must provide continued long-term
economic assistance to rebuild the country.
While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner exchange. During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take home with them. This practice
has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya where similar videos
are being made today and can be found on the web for those so inclined.
We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same way. Sometime
during this war I expect that we will see videos of US prisoners having
their heads cut off.
Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against civilian populations, and to turn this into the world-wide religious war that they desperately want. This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further collaboration of this type of activity please read Kipling). This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and somewhat conversely of compassion and of a character. Towards our enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during war. We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there are many, but for shrewd military logic. For anyone
who is still reading this way too long note, thanks for your patience.
I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more concise
manner.
Richard
Kidd E-mail to
Direct Action Group: |
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We will be celebrating the second anniversary with
the Winter-2002 issue. Deadline: January 7, 2002 |
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