An Armenian Manifesto circa 1923:
Dashnagtzoutiun Has Nothing to do Anymore

"Evaluates the tragic incidents as incidents of war and open heartedly declares that they
[the Armenians] have been tools in the hands of foreign powers.”

ABSTRACT

In 1923 Hovhannēs Katchaznouni the first Prime Minister of the Armenian state delivered a report to an Armenian Congress in Bucharest. Referred to as his Manifesto, it was written in Armenian and self-published in the same year. The Manifesto represents a historical document of great significance for a highly charged and contested debate.  For many decades its existence was unknown to most scholars. Except for one abridged version, the other versions are inaccessible because they have been willfully removed from the world’s libraries by political partisans and the latest commercially produced edition has yet to make an appearance on library shelves.

Two currently available editions are reviewed in this paper on a per-paragraph basis and shown to be consistent on many matters pertaining to Armenian-Turkish issues. Yet they do differ substantially on other significant points. Irrespective of the edition, scholars, opinion makers, policy makers, and concerned people at large should find the information contained of great value since it comes from a most knowledgeable and credible source and it “evaluates the tragic incidents as incidents of war and open heartedly declares that they [the Armenians] have been tools in the hands of foreign powers.”

Key words: Armenia, Turkey, Armenian Manifesto, Katchaznouni, Dashnagtzoutiun, Dashnag, Armenian history.

“History is written by the winners”

INTRODUCTION

There is an old, old, saying which in this world is politically incorrect: “Translation is like a woman. If she is beautiful, she is unfaithful. If she is faithful she is not beautiful.” Translations of literary works tend to be on the beautiful side. On the other hand, translations of historical works tend to the faithful side unless of course politics are involved. And, politics often influence different versions of what occurred. “History is written by the winners” is another old axiom.

Hovhannēs Katchaznouni’s original Manifesto was written in Armenian and he could hardly be considered to have been on the winning side. Katchaznouni witnessed the decimation of his people firsthand and although disagreements abound on the reasons and motives, no rational person debates the fact that over a million Armenians died.

Hovhannes Katchaznouni
Յովհաննէս Քաջազնունի

Hovhannēs Katchaznouni, a pillar of the Dashnagtzoutiun, the Armenian Party, was the first Prime Minister of the Armenian state in 1918. He submitted his Manifesto as a report to a convention of the Dashnagtzoutiun that was convened in Bucharest in April 1923. The original report was delivered and published by the author himself. Its translated title is: "Dashnagtzoutiun Has Nothing to do Anymore." First translated into Russian, the report was published as a book in Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia, in 1927 and only 2000 copies were printed.

Unfortunately for history, not many copies exist of either the Armenian or the Russian versions. In fact the Armenian version cannot be found on the shelves of any library anywhere in the world even though some still list it in their catalogs. Allegedly the copies were removed from the libraries in Europe by the Dashnagzoutiun members.

A truncated edition translated from the original by Matthew A. Callender and edited by John Roy Carlson was published by the Armenian Information Service in English in 1955 and is offered by the University of Louisville on-line. The report/book has a total of 24 pages, a great deal of it dedicated to commentary obviously postdating the original Manifesto. To wit:
Appendix 1(page 16) states:
ARF leaders are wont to boast of their "glorious" independent Republic. Katchaznouni's testimony is fully corroborated by the testimony of another eyewitness, Leon Z. Surmelian, an author now residing in California, who in his autobiography "I Ask You Ladies and Gentlemen" (E.P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1945), made the following observations:
"Father heaped again his scorn and sarcasm on the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. 'It's destroying our nation! It has ruined our schools, disunited our people. What do your leaders know about international politics? Wasn't it all this revolutionary foolishness that caused the Massacre?"' - Page 63. (emphasis added)

Appendix 4 (page 21) states: “Armenians look upon former Turkish regimes as Jewry looks upon Nazi Germany.” (emphasis added)

Cover page of the Manifesto, Armenian Education Service edition ca 1955.

A copy of the Russian edition was located in Moscow’s Lenin library by Mehmet Perinçek, a young Turkish scholar who translated the Russian version into Turkish. The Turkish version in turn was translated into English and published in Istanbul (127 pages). Unfortunately few libraries in the United States carry any of the books in any language and as of this writing Amazon.com shows none as being available to buy.

Cover page of the Manifesto published in Tbilisi (Tiflis), Soviet Georgia, Russian, ca 1927.

Of the various editions and translations of the Manifesto, WorldCat, the world's largest network of library content and services dedicated to providing access to their resources on the Web, shows that only 18 locations in the USA have any of the editions listed ranging from 6 at one location to 1at most others. Outside the USA, 41 libraries have at least one edition and one location boasts 7 copies. The subject of this Manifesto should be of interest to historians, decision makers, opinion makers, and lay people wishing to be better informed about a highly charged subject which unfortunately is in the political domain worldwide.

DISCUSSION

After explaining the basic thesis of the Manifesto, this review draws on two of its English translations (the 1955 Armenian Information Service edition and the 2006 Turko-English translation) and lays bare their respective inconsistencies, omissions and add-ons so the reader may decide which translation is the most faithful. Selected excerpts from each of the editions/translations are juxtaposed with each other in paragraphs representing the most important Turkish-Armenian issues. Because of limited space in this paper other considerations are not shown. The source of each section or paragraph is indicated by a reference shown as a footnote.

On Katchaznouni’s credibility

Now, for the first time in English, is a deep and incisive self-study by a competent Dashnag observer. The author was a pillar of Dashnagtzoutiun. He was the first prime minister of the Republic. He knew every Party secret before, during and after the founding of the ill-fated Republic. Few were in a position to know more, nor to express themselves with greater clarity, logic and foresight than Hovhannes Katchaznouni.

Unlike most Dashnag leaders who were revolutionists, and reared in the early Russian socialist-revolutionary schools, Katchaznouni was born in Akhaltzkha in the Caucasus, the son of a revered Armenian priest.

Hovhannes Katchaznouni … was in power as the head of government … for thirteen months. He was among the founders of the Dashnagtzoutiun Party and one of its top leaders. He was the prime authority of Armenia and the Dashnagtzoutiun Party. He was on the Armenian committee conducting the peace talks with the Turks in Trabzon, and Batoumi.

On the significance of the Manifesto

Katchaznouni's work is a basic source of Dashnag history, and the Armenian Information Service considers it a privilege to be able to present, for the first time, the writings of this Armenian patriot and prophet to an American audience.

Katchaznouni voices a self-criticism of the past in this conference report. This self-criticism is actually a confession. Katchaznouni honestly and sincerely resolves that the Dashnagtzoutiun Party is responsible for the past agonies.

On the issue of Armenian volunteers

It would be useless to argue today whether our bands of volunteers should have entered the field or not. Historical events have their irrefutable logic. In the Fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks because they could not refrain themselves from organizing and refrain themselves from fighting. This was an inevitable result of a psychology on which the Armenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation: that mentality should have found its expression, and did so.

And it was not the A.R.F. that would stop the movement even if it wished to do so. It was able to utilize the existing conditions, give effect and issue to the accumulated desires, hopes, and frenzy, organize the ready forces - it had that much ability and authority. But to go against the current and push forward its own plan - it was unfit, especially unfit for one particular reason: the A.R.F. is a people's mass strong in instinct but weak in comprehension. If the formation of bands was wrong, the root of that error must be sought much further and more deeply. At the present time it is important to register only the evidence that we did participate in that volunteer movement to the largest extent and we did that contrary to the decision and the will of the General Meeting of the Party.

At the beginning of Autumn of 1914 when Turkey had not yet entered the war but had already been making preparations, Armenian revolutionary units began to be formed in Transcaucasia with great enthusiasm, and especially with much uproar. Contrary to the decision taken during the general meeting at Erzurum only a few weeks before, the A.R.F. had active participation in the formation of the units and their future military action against Turkey. … [t]hey were flowing in the direction that the current was taking them.

On collaboration with Russia in WWI

The winter of 1914 and the spring of 1915 were periods of great hope for the Armenians … we had no doubt that the war would end with complete victory for the Allies; Turkey would be defeated and dismembered and its Armenian population would at last be liberated.

We had embraced Russia whole-heartedly without any compunction. Without any positive basis of fact, we believed that that the Tsarist government would grant us a more-or-less broad self-government in the Caucasus and in the Armenian “vilayets” liberated from Turkey as a reward or our loyalty, efforts and assistance.

We had created a dense illusion in our minds. … we had lost our sense of reality and were carried away with our dreams.
… by overestimating our very modest worth and merit, we were naturally exaggerating our hopes and expectations.

With the exception of some paragraph formatting differences, a very important concept is discussed verbatim in both editions.

It would be useless to ask today to what extent the participation of volunteers in the war was a contributory cause of the Armenian calamity. No one can claim that the savage persecutions would not have taken place if our behavior on this side of the frontier was different, as not one can claim the contrary, that the persecutions would have been the same even if we had not shown hostility to the Turks.

This is a matter about which it is possible to have many different opinions. The proof is, however – and this is essential - that the struggle begun decades ago against the Turkish government brought about the deportation or extermination of the Armenian people in Turkey and the desolation of Turkish Armenia. This was the terrible fact!

On the Dashnags

However hard Dashnag propagandists may try to twist and bury the truth, and glorify the failure of their Independent Armenian Republic, truth must eventually prevail. Now, for the first time in English, is a deep and incisive self-study by a competent Dashnag observer.

Katchaznodni's work is published at this time as a refutation to the grandiose, exaggerated and even outrageously false claims of the Dashnag leadership today, mouthed by men who for the most part were mere party functionaries during the days of the Republic, but through the years have blown up themselves into intellectual giants, saviors of Armenia, etc.

On the Armenian-Turkish war

The Armenian-Turkish war which broke out back began in the Fall of 1920. Would it have been possible to evade it? Probably not. The crushed Turkey of l9l8 had recovered during the two years. There came forward patriotic, young officers who formed a new army in Asia Minor. They saw the necessity of attacking in the Northeast, and also in the Southwest against the Greeks which they could not do without first crushing their flank on the Armenian front.

One cannot say that the Turks really had such a plan, but it is possible that they did and it was also probable that the war with us was inevitable. Despite these hypotheses there remains an irrefutable fact. That we had not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evade war. We ought to have used peaceful language with the Turks.
Whether we succeeded or not, and we did not do it. We did not do it for the simple reason - no less culpable - that we had no information about the real strength of the Turks and relied on ours. This was the fundamental error. We were not afraid of war because we thought we would win. With the carelessness of inexperienced and ignorant men we did not know what forces Turkey had mustered on our frontiers. When the skirmishes had started the Turks proposed that we meet and confer. We did not do so and defied them.

Up to this point both translations are identical except for minor paragraph formatting.

Our army was well fed and well armed and dressed but it did not fight. The troops were constantly retreating and deserting their positions; they threw away their arms and dispersed in the villages. Our army was demoralized during the period of internal strife, the inane destructions and the pillages that went without punishment. It was demoralized and tired. The system of roving bands, which was especially encouraged by the Bureau government, was destroying the unity of the military organization, The instruction of the army, its military spirit, its organization and discipline, and therefore its power for defense had deteriorated to the last degree, and that was a surprise to the government: the government and the ministers of war did not know their own army.

And then the government made a fatal mistake. Intending to increase the number of troops, it called under arms additional men who were past middle age and tired, overburdened with family and financial burdens. They were made to put on the military uniforms in a great hurry; rifles were put into their hands and instantly sent to the front. These were ready-made deserters which caused additional defections and demoralization in the ranks of the army.

The following section does not appear in the truncated edition.

I should have pointed out that in the autumn of 1920 we were not a quantité négligable in the eyes of the Turks. The terrible incidents of the past years were forgotten. Our people were well rested and our army was well armed with British arms. We had sufficient ammunition. We were holding a very important fortress called Kars in our hands. Finally there was the Sevres Treaty and it was not simply a piece of paper in those days, it was an important gain against the Turks. We were not in a similar position that we were in Batoum. We could easily believe we could be heard, because Turks were considered the defeated party.

We did not make an attempt….

We now see that if we had agreed on a settlement with the Turks directly … we might have gained a lot. But we could not see this at this point….

War, on the other hand was a reality.

It is also a reality, an unforgivable reality that we did not do anything to avoid war but did just the opposite; we created excuses for it. What is unforgivable is that we had no idea about the military power of Turkey and neither did we know our own army.

On after the peace

Simultaneously, within a few hours of each other, while one Dashnag delegation headed by the retiring prime minister was negotiating with the Soviets at Erivan, another delegation headed by a former prime minister, negotiated with the Turks at Alexandropol -- surrendering Armenia first, from the point of view of chronology, to the Soviets, then some hours later (with the participation of ministers who had already resigned from office) to the Turks: by all odds a masterful though asinine effort at double-dealing. Soviets do not recognize this treaty.

Highly significant is Article 8, wherein Dashnags agreed "to forego their rights to ask for damages. . . as a result of the general war" thus closing the doors FOREVER to reparations for the enormous destruction of Armenian life and property.

Now revealed for the first time in English are the provisions, in their entirety, of the secret Treaty of Alexandropol, signed on December 2, 1920. It is a humiliating treaty, whose contents heretofore have never been divulged by the ARF. A reproduction of the original treaty in Turkish, together with a translation into modern Turkish, appeared in Vol. II, No I of "Die Velt Des Islams" ("The World of Islam'), published by the well-known book firm E.J. Brill, Lieden, Holland.

Neither in letter nor in spirit do the above paragraphs appear in the Turko-English edition.

THIS IS THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA AT GÜMRÜ [ALEXANDROPOL]

On the one part the Turkish Government and on the other part the Armenian Republic, for the purpose of putting an end to the hostilities and to find a thesis of agreement, have sat down for an examination of the facts.
On the part of the Turkish Government:
General Kazım Karabekir Pasha, Commander on the Eastern Front
Süleyman Necati Bey of Erzurum

On the part of the Armenian Republic:
Alexander Khadissian, Prime Minister
Avram Gulhandanian, Minister of Finance
Stepan Gorganian, Minister of the Interior

After due verification of their powers of attorney and the validity of their certificates of authority, the discussions have resulted in the following agreement:

1. State of war between Turkey and the Armenian Republic has ended.
2. The frontier between Turkey and Armenia, as seen on the attached map (starting from the mouth of the Lower Karasou, the River Araxe, the Arpatchai, north to Kekatch, from thence to the valley of Karahan, eastern Teghnis, eastern Great Kemel, Kiziltash, major Aghbaba Mountains) is the limit. The final determination of the frontier will be decided by a mixed commission on the spot two weeks after the signature.

Armenia will not interfere in the administrative form to be chosen by general election and that administration's jurisdiction in Mount Kouki, 10,282 - 8022 - Mount Gamasour, 8160 - the village of Koutoulak - Mount Saat, 7868, -- the houses in Arpatchai, 3080, Mount Kemourlu, 6930 - Sarayboulak, 807 - the station Ararat - the southern part of the estuary of the Lower Karasou on the Araxe River (Nahkitchevan, Shahtakhti, Shamour) and the administration of this zone shall be under Turkish protection. [The numerals about are those on a military map of the time.]

3. The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey may be able to consider the wishes of the Armenian Republic about relocation of the entire native population back into the territories designated in the second article, existing in the old Ottoman boundaries which shall remain to Turkey, by irrefutable historical, ethnic and legalistic rights, accepts their return by a general election within those territories, within three years after the ratification of this treaty. A mixed commission will decide the form of this.

4. So that the possibility of villainous activities and movements resulting from the incitements of imperialistic governments be once for all and permanently prevented and disallowed. The Republic of Erevan undertakes not to maintain any military organization beyond a gendarmerie corps of 1500 riflemen with 8 mountain or field guns and 20 machine guns for the protection of its internal peace. There will be no military conscription in Armenia any more. The Armenian Republic if free to build fortifications and place in them as many heavy artillery pieces as it wishes for the protection of the country against external enemies. In this heavy artillery are 15 cm. Shells and 15 cm. long rifles that can be used, and lesser ones used in field armies. No larger guns will be found.

5. After the peace the Government in Erevan accepts to permit the Turkish representative or ambassador in Erevan to be free to investigate all these matters at any time. In return for that the Grand National Assembly promises military assistance to Armenia in any internal or external trouble.

6. The two parties permit the return of refugees to their hearths across the old boundaries with the exception of those who, during the general war, went to the enemy's army and took arms, and those who crossed occupied territories and participated in massacres, and mutually assure the privileges of minorities obtained in the most civilized countries to those who repatriate themselves.

7. Those of the refugees mentioned in Article 6 who do not return to their hearths within the limit of one year after the ratification of this treaty, besides not being able to benefit from the generosity of the said article, their legal claims also will not be heard.

8. Despite the great expenses which the Grand Assembly of Turkey incurred for its army during two years because of the urgency of the war it had to wage against Armenia, it renounces its right to demand lawful damages, and in the same manner the two parties forego their rights to ask for damages because of the charges which took place as a result of the general war.

9. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey promises to render assistance in the most sincere manner for the complete formulation and defense of the Armenian Republic mentioned in the Second Article with uttermost integrity.

10. The Erevan Government declares and considers void and null the Treaty (of Sevres) which was absolutely rejected by the National Grand Assembly of Turkey, and by recalling the delegations who have been tools in the hands of the imperialist countries and their government circles in the purlieus [sic] of Europe and America, promises its determination to eliminate all kinds of misunderstandings between the two countries; the Republic of Erevan promises to keep away from government circles those pugnacious men who run after imperialist aims and play havoc with the peace of the two nations so that it may give proof of its sincerity for the maintenance of peace and tranquility and the rights of Turkey as a good neighbor.

11. The Armenian Republic admits and vouchsafes the authority of the vicar of the chief of Sheri [sic] of the National Grand Assembly of Turkey to ratify the appointment of the chief Mufti, elected by the direct vote of muftis as well as the organization and enactment of the rights of the people living in the country for the realization of their aspirations and religious sentiments. [The chief Mufti and muftis were to be quartered in Armenia for the Moslems living there.]

12. The two contracting parties mutually promise not to hinder the free passage of any person or any merchandise belonging to any person on all routes (also of Armenia and Iran), from side to side, by sea and between any country in transit operations. The Turkish government assures the freedom of transit operations between Sharour, Nakhitchevan, Shahtakht, and Kjoulfa via Iran, Magou and Armenia.

The Armenian government promises not to impede general transit operations of merchandise, carriages, railroad wagons between Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia and Turkey. The Turkish State will take all railroads and transportation routes in the Erevan Republic under its own control in order to prevent treacherous acts against its integrity and totality by imperialists until complete peace is established and the two parties will forbid the official and unofficial agents of imperialist (Entente) powers from causing any damage or disturbance inside the Republic.

13. The government of the National Grand Assembly can take temporary military preventive measures in Armenia against attacks that may threaten its territorial integrity on condition that such measures do not disturb the rights of the Republic of Erevan conceded in this territory.

14. All treaties signed by the Republic of Erevan with any country that relate to Turkey or are harmful to the interests of Turkey, the said Republic agrees to consider absolutely null and void.

15. Commercial relations between the two parties will begin and ambassadors and consuls will be exchanged upon the signature of the treaty.

16. Regulations for telegraphic, postal, telephone, consular and commercial relations will be established by mixed commissions according to the provisions of this treaty. Meanwhile Turkey will be authorized by the State to resume telegraphic, postal and railroad communications between Armenia and occupied territories as soon as the treaty is signed.

17. In accordance with this treaty, concerning Armenia, by the provisions of the special treaty for the evacuation of territories under Turkish occupation and the repatriation and exchange of prisoners, the determination of the frontiers of the Armenian Republic will immediately be put into effect. The civilians and notables held will be delivered. The exchange of prisoners will be affected by a mixed commission.

18. This treaty is subject to ratification within a month. The ratified copies will be exchanged at Ankara. The plenipotentiary high representatives have signed this treaty of peace and frontier demarcation. This treaty, being in two copies, has been constituted at Kumru-Alexandropol on the date 2/12/1336*. In the case of any dispute agreement can be arrived at by reference to the Turkish text."

December 2, 1921. The Turkish year 1336 corresponds to l92l A.D.

Interestingly, the longer (Turko- English) version does not provide the above Treaty document in letter nor in spirit. However that edition devotes 26 pages to a response Katchaznouni wrote to a “detailed” letter he received from “NN a personal friend and … party comrade concerning the report … submitted to the Party Convention.” He writes:
“Dear NN,
I received your letter on June 22.”
“You say: ‘Though it was not possible to destroy your report before it was read, I wish it would soon be forgotten. And I find it useless and harmful to open this subject to a discussion.’”

So, it was preordained that copies of the report would be destroyed and/or removed from library shelves by party loyalists, the Dashnags.

On concluding remarks

The Dashnagtzoutiun Party should dissolve itself and leave the political arena. His last words are significant; Yes I propose suicide, the party should commit suicide.

The abridged edition never mentions the word “suicide” or the word “dissolve” in connection with the Party. Katchaznouni concluded his Manifesto by saying:

And since the Dashnagtzoutune has nothing else to do anymore -- neither at the present time nor in the future, it must end its existence. Our Party has lost its raison d’etre, its reason for existence. This is the bitter truth. Shall we have the courage to confess the truth and arrive at the proper conclusion?
And the only conclusion is that we must end our existence.
With comradely salutations,
HOVANANNES KATCHAZNOUNI
Bucharest, March, 1923.

However the more comprehensive English edition substitutes the last sentence before the salutations with:
I know, this conference is not authorized to come to definite conclusions. However it is authorized to take this issue up for discussion and to find the means to solve it.
To this end, I propose the following measures:*
*From this point on, particular suggestions concerning the Party follow. I do not find myself authorized to publish them openly (H. Katchaznouni.)

CONCLUSION

The Manifesto represents a historical document which should be of great significance to those involved in a highly charged and contested debate.  For many decades the report’s existence was unknown to most scholars. Except for one abridged version, other versions are inaccessible because they have been willfully removed from libraries by political partisans while the latest commercially produced English edition has yet to appear on library shelves. To the extent that the translation is faithful in this matter the record shows that the removal of both the Armenian and the Russian editions from libraries was preordained by a Party leader as far back as 1923.

While the 1955 and the 2006 English editions are found to be consistent on many matters pertaining to the Armenian-Turkish issues there are significant points on which they differ. The Turkish- English edition states that the Manifesto “evaluates the tragic incidents as incidents of war and open heartedly declares that they [the Armenians] have been tools in the hands of foreign powers.” Scholars, opinion makers, policy makers, and concerned people at large should find the report of great value regardless of the edition since it comes from a most knowledgeable and credible source.

REFERENCES:
1. Alpers, Benjamin L. Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.2003). pp. 383
2. Ataöv, Türkkaya, An Armenian source: Hovhannes Katchaznouni = Une source Armenienne: Hovhannes Katchaznouni = Eine Armenische quelle: Hovhannes Katchaznouni = Fuente Armenia: Hovhannes Katchaznouni, (Ankara : The author?, 1985)
3. Hewsen, Robert, H. "Armenian Names in America" American Speech (Duke University Press, 38 (3): 214–219, October 1963)).
4. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes and Akalın, Lale, The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has nothing to do anymore: (report submitted to the 1923 party convention) (Istanbul : Kaynak Yayinlari, 2006)
5. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes Taşnak Partisinin Yapacağı Bir Şey Yok [Dashnagtzoutiun has nothing to do anymore]  (Istanbul : Kaynak, 2006)
6. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes; Carlson, John Roy, The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has nothing to do anymore: the manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni. (New York : Armenian Information Service, 1955.)
7. Surmelian, Leon Z. I Ask You Ladies and Gentlemen (E.P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1945),
8. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has nothing to do anymore: the manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955.) http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/Katchaznouni.pdf

SOURCES:
1. The author is grateful to Mae Sonmez of Hartford, Connecticut for alerting me to the existence of this Manifesto and encouraging me to review it.
2. Arnold Reisman, author of several books on modern Turkey including:
• An Ambassador and A Mensch: The story of a Turkish Diplomat in Vichy France
• SHOAH: Turkey, the US, and the UK
• Turkey's Modernization: Refugees from Nazism and Ataturk's Vision
• Post-Ottoman Turkey: Classical European Music and Opera
• Arts in Turkey: How Ancient Became Contemporary
• Refugees and Reforms: Turkey's Republican Journey    
• The Transformation of Istanbul: Art Galleries Reviving Decaying Spaces
http://www.nullisecundus-survivorliteratureandlectureservices.com/
3. http://www.djavakhk.com/galerie/disp_img.php?id_img=1329
http://www.jdemirdjian.com/page2008/Democratic_Republic_of_Armenia.htm
4. In August 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by England, France and Turkey, bound Turkey to recognize the independence of Armenia and boundaries drawn Woodrow Wilson. The new Armenian state was recognized by most of the countries, including the United States. However on December 4, 1920, the Soviet Army entered Yerevan and the government of the Armenian Republic effectively stopped working. Soon, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed, under the leadership of Aleksandr Miasnikyan. http://www.jdemirdjian.com/page2008/Democratic_Republic_of_Armenia.htm
5. One of several pen names used by Avedis Boghos Derounian, a journalist. See Alpers, Benjamin L. (2003). Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture. University of North Carolina Press. pp. 383 or Hewsen, Robert H. "Armenian Names in America" American Speech (Duke University Press, 38 (3): 214–219, October 1963)). John Roy Carlson is the best-selling author of Under Cover (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1943) 
6. Hovhannes Katchaznouni; John Roy Carlson The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has nothing to do anymore: the manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni
(New York : Armenian Information Service, 1955.)
7. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has nothing to do anymore: the manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955.)
http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/Katchaznouni.pdf
8. The Soviet archives and translations by the Soviet state are important in that they were not Turkey’s documents. It can be assumed that they render less questionable information. It is certainly from a different country with different political orientations.
9. At the time he was a researcher in Istanbul University’s Atatürk Institute.
Hovhannes Katchaznouni, Taşnak Partisinin Yapacağı Bir Şey Yok [Dashnagtzoutiun has nothing to do anymore]  (Istanbul : Kaynak, 2006)
11. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation: Page 14.
12. November 2010.
13. Located in Moscow’s Lenin library, by Mehmet Perinçek.
14. ARMENIAN QUESTION IS''?''CONFERENCE ... 16-04-2007, http://www.lactuel.be/detail.php?id=1398
15. 4, 6, 1, 5, 2= 18 in the USA
16. 2, 4, 1,1,2, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 7, 3, 1, 1= 41 abroad
17. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation: Page 3
18. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes and Akalin, Lale The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 8
19. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun : Page 3.
20. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes and Akalin, Lale The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 3
21. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 5.
22. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes and Akalin, Lale The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page36
23. Ibid Pages 37, 38
24. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 6.
25. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 3
26. Ibid: Page 6
27. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 9
28. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes and Akalin, Lale The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Pages 68 and 69
29. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 18
30. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Pages 19-21
31. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes and Akalin, Lale The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) :Page 101
32. Ibid Page 125.
33. Ibid Page 8
34. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 14. and Katchaznouni, Hovhannes and Akalin, Lale The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 39
35. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes and Akalin, Lale The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun): Page 100
36. Katchaznouni, Hovhannes and Akalin, Lale The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has nothing to do anymore: (report submitted to the 1923 party convention) (Istanbul : Kaynak Yayinlari, 2006). Back cover.