Better late than never: A Possibility
(for Cyprus!)


by Selin SENOL

For political and social reasons which involve the European Union, United Nations, and NATO, this divided island nation in the Mediterranean Sea, with its capital city being the only divided one in the world, continues to be an important conflict that needs improved multilateral innovation in order to be resolved. This has especially been the case since the island’s Greek population in the South voted against a 2004 UN reunification plan, formulated largely by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, right before the island joined the EU- very hastily and faultily so, as only the southern portion is recognized around the world. The Turkish part of the island, because it was officially formulated after a 1974 military invasion, remains largely unrecognized around the world; this makes the North unable to benefit from EU membership, and prevents the EU from exerting control over the northern part of a ‘member country’.

Over the past three decades, several multilateral mediation efforts took place in different forms, involving both Cypriots as well as international third parties, where attempts were made to both ameliorate Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot social relations as well as reach a political solution; direct negotiations between the respective governments also took place in regards to sovereignty issues of the island. From pre-1974 UN efforts with peacekeeping efforts up until modern-day UN efforts that most notably involved former Secretary General Kofi Annan, to the involvement of international NGO’s (such as Seeds of Peace) and other third party players (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy in Washington D.C, etc): various mediation efforts were attempted in order to effectively deliver a solution between the two sides. Each had a different asset or resource it was ‘bringing to the table’, so to speak, ranging from children’s camps to referendums. Now that there is a newly elected Greek-Cypriot president welcomed by the Turkish side, as well a new UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, who has expressed time and time again interest in the resolution of this divided-island issue, I feel that the timing is ripe for a resolution and history will not forgive our generation if we allow this opportunity to pass us by.

The island, divided between the mainly Turkish northern portion (36%), and the majority-the mainly Greek southern portion (64%) through a UN buffer zone, also consists of two small UK Sovereign Bases. Violence hasn’t been as frequent and deadly in Cyprus as it has been in other regions of intractable conflict around the world, especially in more recent years after various global and inter-dialogue efforts to ameliorate the interstate conflict. An official ceasefire has been in existence for decades since the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island on humanitarian grounds. A small island with a strategic location close to Turkey and Europe to the North, Syria and the Middle East on the East, and Africa in the South, Cyprus has been ruled by many great powers in the past, including the Egyptians, the Persians, and by the empire of Alexander the Great from 333 to 58 BC which began Hellenistic rule in the island- signaling the start of a Greek ancestral presence. It was later ruled by the Roman Empire and the Franks, but between the 1500’s and 1800’s, the island, which is much closer geographically to modern-day Turkey than to Greece, was controlled by the Turkic Ottoman Empire ever since it fell to the Turks in 1571.

Toward the end of the 19th century, as the power of the Ottoman Empire was beginning to decrease with rising nationalism, the administration of the island went to Britain through an alliance, at a time when a crisis with Russia was begging to take prominence for the Ottoman rulers. In 1914, Cyprus was officially annexed by Britain as Turkey entered WWI on the side of Germany and the Central Powers and from 1925 until 1960, the island, consisting mainly of Turkic and Greek populations, was now a British crown colony. From as early on as the 1930’s, however, there began to be calls for an ‘Enosis’, or, ‘re-union’ of Cyprus with Greece, resonating throughout the Greek-Cypriot community; this created tensions between the Greeks and the British, causing many protests against the British presence. This particular uprising was somewhat dimmed during WWII, but tensions started again in 1955 when a nationalist Greek-Cypriot organization, ‘EOKA’, made several terrorist attacks against the British system in Cyprus.

The violence continued intensely until 1958, when the leader of the Greek-Cypriots, Cardinal Makarios, feeling a stronger desire for personal power in Cyprus rather than a nationalistic one to reunite with Greece, said that there would be no more plans to continue with the politics of ‘Enosis’. The British then became willing to grant independence to Cyprus with the condition that they keep a few of their bases there and on August 16, 1960, after about 80 years of tumultuous British rule, the island was relatively peacefully given its independence as the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ with the Zurich Agreement of 1959, under which Makarios was elected President.
For the birth of this new nation, a ‘Treaty of Guarantee’ was agreed upon by the nations involved with the island’s various populations and historic reign: Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Cyprus was given its own constitution under the Treaty, with guarantees by the Greek-Cypriot majority to the Turkish-Cypriot minority such as a place in the parliament, prohibition of ‘enosis’, and a prohibition of a partition of the island. However, the Turkish community continued to be viewed as a pesky minority and ‘enemy of Hellenism’ according to Makarios, and the Greek-Cypriots made a joint agreement with Greece called the ‘AKRITAS Plan’, which continued to desire ‘Enosis’ with Greece- illegal under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, where Greece had agreed to preserve the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. With this plan, in 1963, the bi-national government was ended and the Greek-Cypriot governmental wing forcibly blocked the Turkish Vice President and other members of government from pursuing their functions, allowing the constitution to break apart along with the sovereignty of the Turkish community as co-founders of the newly independent state; Greek-Cypriots had thus monopolized the political power of the island.

In return, UN resolution (168) was passed by the Security Council of the United Nations on March of 1964, employing a peacemaking force into Cyprus (UNFICYP) as a result of numerous attacks on Turkish villages, murders of Turkish journalists desiring inter-communal cooperation, and atrocities committed against Turkish Cypriots in the city of Limassol. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established with the mission of preventing a recurrence of fighting, contributing to a return to normal conditions and the maintenance of law and order. The resolution nonetheless made it clear that the Greek-Cypriot rulers were seen as the legitimate government in all of Cyprus, with the UN possibly fearing that viewing the Turks in Cyprus as an equal community in the country as Greeks could potentially lead to uprisings from other member-nations of the UN General Assembly that also had minorities.

This had harsh economic and discriminatory affects on the Turks in Cyprus, who were forced to live in small ghettos scattered all over Cyprus between 1963 and 1974, with severe violence being committed against them and with as many as 25,000 Turkish Cypriots becoming refugees in what they’ve always known to be their country; they began fleeing to any areas which they felt might be safer. To those Greek-Cypriots who had committed violence against the British system in Cyprus in hopes of ‘enosis’, prior to their independence 1960, the British presence was merely seen as an interference and wasn’t the main problem. The real problem was most likely the historically-rooted pride issue between the Greeks and the Turks for control of the island, as well as a Greek sense of rebellion against the domination of the more powerful Turkish Ottoman Empire that had captured a lot of surrounding nations during its long and successful reign: including Greece until its independence in 1829. Therefore, almost as soon as the British withdrew most of its presence on the island, there were now major tensions occurring between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority. Nationalist groups from both sides started arming themselves against one another after the constitutional breakdown of 1963, and a civil war erupted which led to deaths of many people.

Hence, although there was no official partition of the country until 1974, this was around the time when it was becoming more and more unofficially split-up between the two sides anyway. After the United Nations put up its 1964 demarcation line between the 2 sides for peacekeeping efforts, the Turkish minority mainly focused on trying to settle in the northern region since it was geographically very close to Turkey. Despite the UN intervention, violence continued and in August of that same year, the Greek-Cypriot National Guards, ‘CNG’, attacked three Turkish villages. In response, the Turkish Air Force got involved by sending fighter-bombers, including North American F-100 C/D Super Sabres, and started strikes against CNG positions with bombs, threatening an invasion to calm the situation although an actual Turkish-invasion was then internationally frowned upon and tended to be avoided.

Unfortunately, the extremism of the ‘Enosis’ movement continued to rear its ugly head. In 1967 a military junta seized control in Greece which strongly put the idea of unification with Greece on the agenda once again, and on July 15, 1974, the CNG helped stage a military coup against Greek-Cypriot President Makarios, replacing him with a more fanatically nationalistic president: Nikos Sampson. Naturally, the Turks saw this as a threat to their Turkish minority living on the island that were already being persecuted in efforts for the whole island to become as ‘Greek’ as possible, and acted quickly under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit in Turkey, beginning an invasion from the North on July 20, 1974.

The Turkish victory, after a second invasion in August following the breakdown of some peace-talks in Geneva, resulted in Nikos Sampson resigning and being replaced with the more moderate Clerides- who would remain president until Makarios returned in December of 1974. International fears that the conflict would spill over into a Turkish-Greek war, where both countries were US allies who had been members of NATO since 1952, eventually subsided-although a Turkish army presence remains on the island to this day. The biggest claim the Turks had for the invasion was the Greek violation of the articles under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, which stated “…Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island”. The Treaty’s ‘Article IV’ specifically gave Turkey the right to act since it stated that “In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty”.

On July 19, 1974, Makarios made a speech before the UN Security Council after the Greek-Cypriot National Guards had staged their military coup, confirming Turkish fears. “For sometime talks were being conducted between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus for the finding of a peaceful solution...but how could there be any progress at the talks when the Cyprus policy of the Athens regime was double-faced...how did the military regime of Greece establish and support the terrorist organization EOKA-B, the purpose of which was stated to be the Union of Cyprus with Greece...all people of Cyprus, both Greeks and Turks, will suffer”. Hence, with what they had genuinely believed to have been a justified military intervention in 1974, especially because of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Turkish military persistence continued strong and soon 195,000 Greek Cypriots were expelled from the north and 55,000 Turkish Cypriots were moved to the north from the south. This was followed by a division of the island into a Turkish-Cypriot North and Greek-Cypriot South by a United Nations ‘line of peace’.

The Turkish-Cypriots proclaimed independence in 1975 and to this day, Turkey is the only member of the international community that recognizes this area that they’ve been calling the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ since 1983, versus what they call a ‘Greek Authority of Southern Cyprus’- unfairly known to the outside world simply as the “Republic of Cyprus”. In 1985, the Turkish-Cypriots adopted their own constitution, after years of being deprived of many rights since Cardinal Makarios had become president in 1960, and held their own elections that same year: another arrangement internationally only recognized by Turkey. A UN Security Council resolution passed in 1983 even called on all member-states to deny the recognition of any Cypriot state other than the Greek Cypriot south; hence, relative to the Greek side, Turkish Cypriots have been suffering economically under an international embargo since that time, with the natural exception of trade with Turkey.

Mediation efforts to unite the island was taking place even before the Turkish invasion; while Cyprus was still a British colony, British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, held discussions in London in August of 1955 in order to attempt a tripartite solution to a problem which was becoming an increasing concern to all the parties involved, as the Greek Orthodox desire for a Cypriot ‘enosis’ with Greece was resonating throughout the island. British Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, suggested an even more efficient self-governing method for Cyprus that included Turkish representation at the parliamentary level, as well as a tripartite, Greek-Turkish-British committee to oversee that the Cypriot affairs went smoothly. The discussions yielded no results, as the Greek side, even then, refused to accept anything except self-determination and the Turkish side refused to accept any agreement which didn’t specifically denounce such a possibility.

After British rule ended and fighting persisted on the island, a 1965 UN mediation effort was attempted through the passing of a General Assembly resolution calling on all parties involved to "...Respect the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and to refrain from any intervention directed against it";it broke down when clashes continued, nearly resulting in a Turkish-Greek war. While the tumultuous Turkish-Greek rifts were occurring within the inter-communal island, John Burton and fellow University College colleagues from London, meanwhile, were engaging in one of their ‘Interactive Conflict Resolution’ initiatives in London, hosting discussions with representatives from both Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities in 1966. Later contacts, made in retrospect, proved these discussions to have been effective in allowing the continuation of further UN-sponsored negotiations about the island-conflict. Burton’s Cypriot workshop inspired him to develop a model of ‘controlled communication’, stressing the role of third-party intervention in creating a “non-threatening, analytical atmosphere in which the parties could mutually examine their misperceptions about the conflict and each other, and then jointly explore functional avenues toward resolution”. This certainly explains the psychological advantage in having outside mediators aid in bringing representatives from two bickering sides to a region outside the conflict area to try to resolve some of their differences. The fact that the main mediator was British and that the meetings took place in England was also symbolic, as Britain had been involved in the history of the island, as aforementioned, and could be seen as a non-partisan party whose interest in the resolution of the conflict could nonetheless be logically perceived.

After the island officially split into two sides after 1974, and as the world was increasingly being recognized more and more as ‘globalized’, with mutual and transnational concerns for harmony since the 1980’s, more collaborations began taking place in a more global scale in order to negotiate a reunification, or any other resolution, which would ensure the possibility of the two sides living under a more sustainable and efficient peace. In 1984, a Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security was established, which organized numerous seminars focusing on the protracted Cyprus conflict. It was followed up by a project lasting from 1989 to 1991 that used conflict-analysis workshops to bring together affluent Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. A 1990 intense-dialogue workshop consisted of Turkish and Greek-Cypriots living in Canada with ties to those living in Cyprus- sometimes even ties to decision-makers themselves on the island. A follow-up, track-two type of workshop was held in England in 1991, where unofficial representatives from the two island-communities began acknowledging underlying concerns and suggesting potential ‘peacemaking activities’ to resolve them. The workshop, influenced by such notable mediators as Herbert Kelman of Harvard University and Ronald Fisher, resulted in ‘success’, as reported to both sides back home, and continued after the discussions with bi-communal art-exhibits and the creation of a joint committee aiming to foster inter-communal contact.

Unfortunately, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security was abolished in 1992, pointing out a possible disadvantage of having outside mediators; the two sides can always have the fear that a third-party’s commitment and involvement can decline over time because of financial issues, issues of time, or even issues of changing interests and priorities. Since 1992, however, further support for peace-projects for the two sides was able to be gathered through various other sources of funding alongside of the involvement of UN peacekeeping forces on the island. Various notable scholars began emphasizing throughout the 1990’s the role of education to help de-escalate tensions and maintain inter-communal relations, stressing the role of knowledge and education in easing the harmful effects that cultural propaganda can have on the minds of youth. Two other workshops followed that assigned workshop-graduates to specific peacemaking tasks; despite interruptions by Greek-Cypriot nationalists opposing both intercommunal talks and the North American involvement, the workshops have been deemed a success in follow-up interviews with the various participants. Unfortunately, funding for further similar workshops, however, has been relatively weak.

One of the most successful mediative efforts on the Cyprus issue has come from bi-communal training groups set up by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy in Washington D.C, which began getting involved in the conflict in 1991, and it’s ‘Cyprus Consortium Project’. In the beginning, IMTD worked alongside of the NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Sciences, traveling to Cyprus and helping to create a Bicommunal Steering Committee, and holding a ten-day intensive-training in intercommunal relations and conflict resolution; 10 Turkish Cypriots and 10 Greek Cypriots, largely peace activists, were participants. The participants then returned to Cyprus with increased hope and understanding, calling themselves ‘The Oxford Group’. Cyprus Fulbright Commission and the non-governmental organization ‘AMIDEAST’ soon aided the Group with funding, allowing for the IMTD to form the ‘Cyprus Consortium Project’, sharing resources with the Conflict Management Group (CMG) of Cambridge, Massachusetts as well as with NTL; this in turn allowed for 8 successful training programs to be held in 1994 with over 200 participants. Many participating students returned to Cyprus and told their respective media-sources the benefits they found to having such inter-communal dialogue and peace initiatives, trying their best to reduce Cypriot suspicions of similar global mediation and track-two diplomatic efforts.

From 1996-1998, on top of various scholarships given to Cypriot students in the United States, many more mediation-training workshops were held in Virginia, Massachusetts, and Cyprus, and thanks to grants provided by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, more efficient workshops included ones for actual policy-makers themselves. Two majors ones took place in Hague, Netherlands and Nova Scotia, Canada in 1997, bringing together a mix of ‘Scenario Planning’ experts and young Cypriot students, with the latter being funded directly by the Canadian government. The Cyprus Consortium even went to Cyprus in 1998 with two influential experts, both of whom knew extensively about the interestingly similar intractable conflict in Northern Ireland-Sherry Immediato, looking at specific scenarios offered such as ‘fixes that backfire’, and Hugh O’Doherty- a conflict resolution scholar who geared his advice mostly toward policy-makers, pointing out some recent breakthroughs after similar steps were followed in the Irish conflict.Sadly, after such successful workshops engaging such a diversity of influential actors throughout the years, the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy has not been able to come up with new ideas ever since the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the 2004 Annan Plan.

Fortunately though, Seeds of Peace, best known worldwide for bringing together Jewish and Palestinian youth in summer camps in efforts to ameliorate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, appears to have picked up immensely where the British/Turkish/Greek/Canadian governments, IMTD, and the United Nations have left off. Seeds of Peace began its youth camps in Cyprus at the request of the US State Department in 1998, and the program cites as its main raison d’etre: “As generations changed and memories of a bi-communal history was lost, younger generations learned stereo-types about each other based on the horrors and perceived histories of the war. To prepare the next generation to live together, Seeds of Peace provides its youth with the conflict management skills and network of friendships required for coexistence”.The program is proud to announce that around 100 Cypriot students from both communities continue to graduate annually from the summer program held in Maine- since such togetherness might inflict unnecessary harm upon the youth inside Cyprus. When they return to Cyprus, graduates tend to keep in contact with ‘Seeds’ alumni from other peace groups, and help organize bi-communal activities inside of Cyprus on a regular basis.

There have been bi-communal concerts held in Cyprus to show the similarity between the two friendly and festive cultures and to further promote peace, although small-scale protests and violent disruptions from both sides did arise throughout many of them: a 1997 concert of Greek singer Sakis Rouvas and Turkish singer Burak Kut in the divided capital, Nicosia, is one example. Six thousand free tickets were provided randomly to youth from both sides of the island for the UN-sponsored concert, held on May 19- a day meaning different things for both sides; in Turkey, it’s referred to as ‘Kemal Ataturk Day’, celebrating the beloved founder of the secular Turkish republic, as well as sometimes being called ‘Youth day’. For Greeks, however, it is a day they choose to commemorate the Pontiac-Greek lives lost in the Black Sea region of Turkey during the early years of the 20th century as the Ottoman Empire was on the brink of collapse.

The right-wing Turkish extremist group ‘Grey Wolves’ made threats against Kut’s life and called on all Turkish-Cypriots to boycott what they claimed was a discriminatory concert, as it was not allowing Turkish citizens. Simultaneous to the concert, but in another part of Nicosia, young members from Greek extremist groups such as the Cyprus Motorcycle Federation and the Pancyprian Anti-occupation Movement, along with Armenian and Kurdish representatives who also hold grudges against the Turkish government, participated in violent protests of the peaceful concert, resulting in arrests and the use of tear gas by the police. Other than these incidents of misorderly conduct, the concert itself went well and the two singers even embraced on stage at one point; bi-communal political representatives, diplomats, as well as the UN chief of mission in Cyprus were also present at the event.

There also exist several other joint Greek-Turkish creative projects, such as online forums for peace, movies, pottery workshops, symposiums, etc. Suggestions by a popular Cypriot online forum, started by a Greek-Cypriot peace-lover named Savas Savvides, should particularly be of interest to political leaders from both sides of the island, as it offers 10 viable solutions to the conflict based upon a general consensus of forum members. Some of its most commendable solutions include: the selection of a Turkish-Cypriot as the leader of a united Cyprus, privatization of all government-owned industries to allow Cyprus to compete globally and avoid political discrimination, allowing veto powers to both sides in major international treaties, offering legal status to Turkish settlers, establishment of a Ministry of Turkish-Cypriot Affairs with a guaranteed budget which would show that the majority isn’t ignoring the minority, and respecting the property rights of both sides in Cyprus where refugees should be allowed to return to their lands across Cyprus prior to 1974- with co-ownership granted to them together with the contemporary land developers since the occupation.

Mr. Savvides also has a powerful message on his main website that reads, “The village where I was born contains an eleventh century Byzantine church and a mosque--monuments which testify better than any words, the ability of the Cypriot people to live together harmoniously. Greek and Turkish families in my village sent their children to study in separate but equal schools, spoke each other’s languages and conducted business with one another without strife. Today, Cyprus is divided by the ‘green line’ - a no man's zone that cuts across the island. But no such divisions exist in cyberspace. We encourage every individual desiring peace in Cyprus to join us in our efforts to ensure that the cooperation and peace, which characterized the relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots for centuries, may again be restored and enjoyed by future generations”.

Meetings between two modern-day leaders of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot leader who came to power in 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos, and his Turkish-Cypriot counterpart Rauf Denktas- replaced in 2005 by Mehmet Ali Talat) also took place several times for conciliation efforts, largely to no avail. Both Papadopoulos and Denktas initially expressed some hope in March of 2004, when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a plan “...to reunify Cyprus (that) would create a single state comprised of two equal components offering a single Cypriot leadership”. It was proposed to the two sides in separate referenda to see if they would come to an agreement, at a time when the scheduled date for Cyprus’ entry into the European Union was approaching. The Annan Plan, as it became widely known, proposed the creation of a ‘United Cyprus Republic’ which would be covering the island of Cyprus in its entirety with the exception of the British Sovereign Base Areas. This new country would be a loose and bi-zonal confederation of two constituent states – the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State – joined together by a minimal federal government arrangement based on political equality for both peoples.

Results from separate yet simultaneous Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot referenda in April were to determine Cyprus’ entry into the European Union on May 1st of that same year either as a united country, finally, or as a divided island with only the Greek side being recognized and supported throughout most of the world. Although there was some last-minute hesitation from Turkish-Cypriot President Denktas, upset that the Turkish side was losing slightly more territory under the reunification plan, as well as from some Turkish right-wing nationalist groups, Greek opposition was the loudest and most negative one by far. Despite international pressure from many world leaders, including George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and Kofi Annan himself ofcourse, President Papadopoulos strongly opposed the plan, pressuring Greek-Cypriot media to do the same. Former Greek-Cypriot Presidents Glafcos Clerides and George Vassiliou, who were supporting reunification and believing that it would be the best thing for the Cypriot people, condemned this Greek negativity.

A large ‘ohi’ (‘no’) campaign, suspected to have been supported by Greek-Cypriot political leaders as well as the island’s largest Greek-Cypriot political party, ‘AKEL’ Communist party, became louder and more supported as the days of the referendum neared. An AKEL leader stated that their main reason for opposition was the Russian veto of a UN resolution which would have banned arms-supply to Cyprus and intensified the UN peacekeeping mission there; the Greek-Cypriots are concerned about the presence of Turkish troops remaining at the North. Whereas the Turkish-Cypriots approved of the plan by a 2 to 1 margin, despite the fact that they would be losing some of their territory with the plan calling for an increase in the amount of land to be controlled by the Greek-Cypriots up to 71.4 %, as well as the fact that it would mean an eventual retreat of Turkish troops, the Greek side disappointed all peace and reunification efforts by rejecting the plan by a 3 to 1 margin. Hence, the nation of Cyprus entered the European Union on May 1, 2004 under a Greek-Cypriot image, with the de facto line still dividing the two sides to this day, leaving the Turkish region in global isolation for the most part.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remains recognized only by Turkey and the EU since 2004 only as a part of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’; it is considered a state with only ‘de facto’ (by practice and not law) territorial control, like Taiwan. The international community treats such a state either by embargos and sanctions, by ignoring them, or by coming to some limited sort of acceptance of their existence. “The international embargo campaign has hurt the TRNC economy,” says Scott Pegg, Assistant Professor in the International Relations Department of Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. “The fact that no country other than Turkey maintains direct air links with the TRNC substantially increases both the costs and the inconvenience of traveling to Northern Cyprus and is a serious impediment to the development of the tourist industry there. The impact of this measure alone on the TRNC’s fragile economy is enormous. The overall effects of the embargo also show up in per capita income statistics. Depending on whose figures you use, Greek Cypriot per capita income is somewhere between three to four times higher than Turkish Cypriot per capita income”.

Many Greek scholars, like Costas Melakopides-a professor of political science at the University of Cyprus, meanwhile, defend the internationally-condemned Greek-Cypriot rejection of the plan, saying such a reunification would have been unworkable in practice, formally justifying the Turkish invasion of a sovereign state, and unfair to Cypriots themselves by being a hurried international attempt merely to ease Turkey’s own accession into the European Union- favored by its allies. Others add that the United States and the UK were supporting the plan to secure a strategic partnership with Turkey on the issue of the war in Iraq, and believe that Kofi Annan’s special adviser in the Cyprus reunification matter, Alvaro De Soto, was being guided directly by American and British leaders;this points to another disadvantage that mediation efforts can result in, namely that of political suspicions.
The Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims they are doing the best they can to be fair to the upset Turkish Cypriot community, citing:

“The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is the first to support the economic development of Turkish Cypriots; an economic development based on the proper criteria that promote the ultimate aim of facilitating the reunification of our country. This has been shown in practice by the announcement and implementation of four packages of measures, of 30 April 2003, 26 April 2004, 16 and 30 July 2004, respectively. These measures have in essence freed the intra island trade of agricultural and manufactured goods, minerals, produced in the northern part of Cyprus, as well as their exports through the legal ports and airports of the Republic of Cyprus”.

Nonetheless, the Greek-Cypriot leadership is quick to stubbornly insist that the ‘illegal’ Turkish occupation and its aid to Turkish-Cypriot citizens, in order for them to travel in and out of the island safer, are to blame. “Unfortunately, due to political considerations, such far-reaching measures are not being made use of, due to the insistence of the occupation regime for direct trade through illegal ports and airports in violation of international law.”The same report chastises the British acceptance of Turkish aid to Northern Cyprus largely in the form of trade, stating, “The Government of the Republic of Cyprus strongly believes that the welfare and prosperity of the people of Cyprus lie with the economic integration of the two communities and the unification of the economy of Cyprus. The United Kingdom Government should not support proposals, which promote and present a situation of external trade with a secessionist entity as lawful”.

The Supreme Court in Cyprus also recently rejected a Turkish-Cypriot appeal to be able to vote on their representative deputies in Parliament; the reason given was that “...the appellants were living in the occupied north under the wing of Turkish occupying forces and therefore did not have the right to vote in matters concerning the Cyprus Republic”. When one looks at such quotes from the Greek-Cypriot government, it appears very likely that those in power in Cyprus will remain oblivious to the absolutely necessary Turkish reasons for invading the island, and refuse to let bygones be bygones if they continuously refer to the Turkish presence-there for the protection of the island’s Turkish population-as ‘illegal occupiers’. Kofi Annan, representing the United Nations, had proudly stated with hope, after he proposed his plan on the thirtieth anniversary of the island’s partition, that for Cypriots, the 2004 referendum would have been the most critical point of their lives in the last 30 years. “We hope they appreciate what a unique opportunity this is, and that they will seize the chance for a just and lasting peace in Cyprus.” Although it’s very unfortunate that this has not been the case, the international mediation community of NGOs and training groups cannot afford to be pessimistic after the failure of reunification in 2004; many Cypriots continue to disagree upon any classic possibilities of settlement and need further innovative guidance.

In a relatively recent UNFICYP opinion poll from 2007, 70 percent of Greek-Cypriots didn’t believe that there would be a settlement of the Cypriot conflict in the near future and 57 percent of Turkish-Cypriots polled also shared this view. There was disagreement, sadly yet expectedly, on the question of the most desirable solution to the settlement issue; 72 % of Greek-Cypriots still consider a unitary state as acceptable while most Turkish-Cypriots reject the idea, and 59 % of Turkish-Cypriots consider a two-state solution satisfactory: a solution most Greek-Cypriots reject.Hence, it appears that despite global efforts to effect Cypriot policy and foster peaceful feelings amongst the Cypriot youth, when it comes to an actual social arrangement, both sides refuse to yield. The Turkish-Cypriot desire for a two-state solution, however, merely demands equality and fairness, and must hence be respected; it is a solution that more neutral countries around the world, so as not to arouse suspicion, should be mediating in the region.

Even in the much deadlier Israeli-Palestinian conflict, global efforts are favoring and working toward a two-state solution; the Greek-Cypriot insistence on calling the North ‘occupiers’ is similar to the widespread Middle Eastern refusal to accept the state of Israel in the region. Only time will tell if more neutral governments will be courageous enough to approach the conflict, as Canada has been in the 1990’s, and whether more peace-loving Greek-Cypriots like Savas Savvides will speak out for a fairer settlement agreement. In the meantime, one can only place his or her hopes on the future Cypriot policy-makers: the children and youth of today who are seemingly being fostered with more loving feelings toward their neighbors, through various creative projects and other social means, rather than being fed propaganda.

Turkey would especially benefit from a resolution to the Cypriot issue, as it remains a major roadblock in its own EU accession; a major EU complaint, expressed for legal reasons that refer to a prior agreement between the EU and Turkey, is Turkey’s continuing ban on allowing ships and planes from the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), which Turkey does not recognize, to have access to Turkish ports and airports. Turkey hasn’t yet lifted its ban as promised, having the precondition that the Cyprus problem is resolved, as the Northern-Cypriot isolation is a major blow to the island’s economic status as well as Turkey’s famous national pride.

Current trends in Cyprus arouse hope in many Cypriots, as well as the international community, who look forward to this issue being resolved. The recently elected Greek-Cypriot president, Demetris Christofias, is a Communist whose ideology is much closer to the leftist Turkish-Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, where both of them even have ties dating back to a Cypriot trade union movement. The two men have expressed time and time again that they want to launch once again a peace movement which has been stalled since the 2004 South-Cypriot EU accession disaster. In 2008, Talat was seen walking among locals in the South to celebrate the symbolic reopening of Ledra Street- a crossing point between the two sides. “Mr. Christofias' predecessor displayed no interest in a partnership approach to reunifying the island,” says Bruce Fein, a resident scholar at the Turkish Coalition of America and chairman of the American Freedom Agenda, referring to Papadopoulos. “But success will crown that endeavor only if the United States and European Union play a catalytic role by honoring what they previously promised years ago in 2004: ending the punitive isolation of Turkish Cypriots that makes stalemate irresistible to Greek Cypriots”.

Although it unfortunately did not come to be implemented, as a result of their positive endorsement of the Annan Plan, Turkish Cypriots were promised by the UN an end to their economic isolation mainly as a reward to parties who follow U.N. recommendations. The promise was also meant to encourage Greek Cypriots to sooner or later comply with reunification, showing them that stalling for time and rejecting mediation suggestions would no longer work to make Turkish Cypriots suffer financially, and to decrease the per capita income gap between Greek Cypriots (around $27,000) and Turkish Cypriots (around $13,000). The latter point of wanting to avoid the financial problems faced by a reunified Germany in 1990, due mainly to mismanaged structural and macroeconomic policies, serves as a good cautionary tale to northern Cyprus in any future negotiation.

In early 2008, Turkish-Cypriot president Talat met with top Turkish officials, including the Turkish military, in Ankara, where it was agreed that the “virgin birth” concept, which refers to the idea of a new constituent state being established on the island from scratch, will be the common position of the Turkish side in any negotiations; this was also the bottom line of the Annan plan, with the Turkish side hence making it clear that it simply cannot accept any formula which would mean a step away Annan plan.By the time the March 21st meeting between Talat and Christofias came around, however, Talat expressed initial concern over the shift of public attention away from Cyprus in Turkey, referring to the heated political debate in that country over the possible closing of the AK Party in power by the country’s Constitutional Court for ‘anti-secular activities’. I would like to see this is as a blessing in disguise, however, for Northern Cyprus, learning to be able to handle its own business as usual as a sovereignty, separate from Turkish political support; Talat has already expressed this confidence at the meeting, yet could certainly be able to do more so if the unfortunate international embargo against North Cyprus was lifted. Ankara expressed fear that the March 21st meeting was only able to initiate a process with Christofias based not on the Annan plan, to which the Greek-Cypriot side still hasn’t been sold, but on the ‘July 8 process’: launched under Papadopoulos' term and referring to a very slow ‘solution’ only, through the workings of technical committees.
Talat rejected criticism that the new process is like the July 8 process: "Comparing the Annan plan and the July 8 process is like comparing apples and oranges. One is a plan for "Comparing the Annan plan and the July 8 process is like comparing apples and oranges,” Talat retorted, however. “One is a plan for settlement, the other is a process…We have a timetable here now; committees must wrap up their work in three months. We did not have this in the July 8 process." When asked to respond to concerns that the renewed Greek-Cypriot desire for dialogue could potentially be in appearances only to fix a Greek-Cypriot image negatively affected by the unrelenting Papadopoulos, "There would be much disappointment, not only in Cyprus but also in the international community,” Talat responded. “The UN will not commit itself to solution efforts if this effort also fails. Therefore, I believe it is more than just an image campaign…”He also added that the UN has promised to take an active role in the new process and that it would be appointing a new Cyprus envoy in three months, also urging firmly, meanwhile, the EU to work on easing the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, reassuring that such practices would not be used as an alternative to reunification by Turkey.

Ban Ki-moon has some big shoes to fill as well as a major responsibility in the reunification of this island once and for all if the UN is ever to be taken seriously around the world as an enforcer of promises rather than expressing pure rhetoric, although he is not alone in sharing that responsibility. A clearly disappointed Secretary-General Kofi Annan, declared on May 28, 2004, after the horrendous Greek-Cypriot refusal of the reunification plan: "[The Turkish Cypriot] vote has undone whatever rationale might have existed for pressuring and isolating them...I would hope [the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all states to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council [non-recognition] resolutions”.The Council of the European Union also expressed sympathy with the Turkish Cypriot side after the referenda, stating, "The Turkish Cypriot community has expressed their clear desire for a future within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community." Even the U.S. State Department expressed that Turkish Cypriots would not be left ‘out in the cold’; it’s been years, and yet these promises have been made to no avail, mourns Bruce Fein, as no efforts were made to life the international embargo against the Turkish side.

“The United States and the EU should pioneer the opening of direct trade, travel, communications and investment with the Turkish Cypriot side,” he says, suggesting that, like Taiwan, Turkish Cypriots should be granted admission to the World Trade Organization without any undermining of a ‘one Cyprus’ policy. “Turkish Cypriots have kept reconciliation alive... They have promoted an additional sixth crossing point between the two sides at Ledra-Lokmaci...established a new secondary school for Greek Cypriots in Karpas despite the absence of Greek Cypriot reciprocity schooling opportunities for Turkish Cypriots in the south... [and] established a tribunal approved by the European Court of Human Rights to adjudicate Greek Cypriot property claims in the north. Greek Cypriots have not reciprocated with an impartial property tribunal to hear Turkish Cypriot claims in the south.”Such considerations need to seriously be considered by Ban Ki-moon as he thinks of ways in which the UN can help this time around, after the failure of the Annan Plan, when the planned negotiation between the two local island-governments take place this summer; anything he comes up with needs to seriously keep the legacy of the Annan Plan in mind and be creative in ensuring a solution with which the Turkish side can once and for all be left satisfied. Most recently in March, after the hosting of a meeting between Christofias and Talat by a Special Representative in Cyprus, Michael Moller, the Secretary General has expressed a ‘warm welcome’ of the two leaders’ decisions to set up several working groups and committees before full-fledged negotiation talks within three months, as well as their agreement on the opening of the symbolic Ledra Street in Nicosia, according to his spokesperson Michele Montas.
Previously in 2007, one year after the unprogressive passing of a July 8, 2006 agreement, known as the Gambari process since UN Undersecretary General Ibrahim Gambari negotiated that meeting, Ban Ki-Moon had publicly expressed disappointment and called for further engagement and courage from the two sides for a resolution. The 2006 agreement, agreed upon by Talat and former Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos, was supposed to establish some political and social committees to work to improve the climate between the two sides and prepare conditions for comprehensive talks for a resolution of the Cyprus problem; however, the two sides could not even agree on a venue where the committees could meet!The main excuse that most hardliner Greek-Cypriots express for any reunification process tends to be the relatively large presence of Turkish troops on the island to maintain the sovereignty of the northern side- a problem which, I feel, can be resolved with an increased presence of Greek troops on the island for deterrence. In a reunification plan, hopefully in the near future, however, both troops should agree to full cooperation with the UN forces to ensure a peaceful presence.

Not too long ago, the Greek-Cypriot government of Cyprus invited applications for oil and gas exploration to the south of the island, which both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus angrily denounced, expressing that the two sides of the island should work on resource exploration as partners, with each others’ consent. Greek-Cypriots have already delineated the sea boundaries between the island and Egypt and Lebanon in 2005 in the eastern Mediterranean to prospect possible undersea oil and gas fields; in retaliation, the Turkish government granted licenses to the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation to begin exploratory drilling in the eastern Mediterranean as well, closer to the Turkish and TRNC regions.Although this dispute has been used by both sides to reassert their relative political rights, there are also important economic considerations, hence having the potential to perhaps include businessmen and the private sector in any mediation attempts as well; the eastern Mediterranean region is estimated to contain reserves of up to 10 billion barrels of oil that remain unexploited.
There is also an attempt in historic reconciliation currently taking place, for the first time in a genuine and humane manner rather than using propaganda and finger-pointing, with the support of the International Committee of the Red Cross with DNA testing done to try to identify human remains found in mass graves across the island for the families who have been, up to date, living only with a 30+ year-old memory of their missing loved ones. Professional teamwork and forensic technology is used to legitimize this attempt, using expert experience from other conflicts, both past and present, including Iraq, Bosnia, and Argentina.

In January of 2008, the Greek prime-minister, Costas Karamanlis, became the first Greek premier to visit Turkey since 1959, as the two countries have been having improved economic relations since post-earthquake mutual aid from both sides in 1999; Turkish PM Tayyip Erdogan had already visited Greece in 2004. Both spoke about the need for reunification talks to resume between the two sides of the island and gave a generally positive tone, yet both had continuing demands from each other where if these don’t become met, it could have a very negative impact on any future Cypriot negotiations; the two country’s ‘proxy’ governments on the island could potentially not reunite not agree on any mutually satisfactory deal. "As long as Turkey fulfills its obligation, the European Union is obliged to accept Turkey as a full member," Karamanlis said at a joint news conference, adding other demands alongside a solution to the Cyprus problem, such as the reopening of a particularly controversial Greek Orthodox seminary in Turkey, that was shut down, for religious and legal reasons, over twenty years ago, and the expansion of the rights of religious minorities in Turkey. Erdogan, meanwhile, reminded Karamanlis of the need for the rights of Turkish minorities in Greece needed to be improved as well, alongside of the need to reach an agreement over the territorial borders of the Aegean Sea through bilateral dialogue rather than through the International Court of Justice-like Greece wants.

The Greek president, Karolos Papoulias, meanwhile, has a much more negative tone than the Greek PM in regards to reaching any momentum or progress on talks with the Turkish Cypriot community. On an official trip to the South of Cyprus in 2005, Papoulias was still stubbornly referring to the Turkish army’s presence on the island, stating that it was “in a free democratic country [that is a] member of the EU…the most direct violation of human rights”. Although President Papoulias stated that everyone is looking forward to positive talks for the Cyprus problem, he noted, agreeing with former Greek-Cypriot president at the time, Papadopoulos, the desire of such talks being “…without any tight timetables, without any arbitration…”Such language, which stalls for time and ensures that both Greek-Cypriots and Greece escape any need to make concessions as well if an agreement is to be reached, is surely harmful to any peace negotiation in the face of an economically suffering Turkish North , and hopefully the new Greek-Cypriot president could convince Papoulias in Greece otherwise.

In conclusion, a plan similar to the ‘Annan Plan’ of a United Cyprus, consisting of two geographical zones similar to provinces or states rather than political divisiveness, suggested along with the possibility of political equality with a potential Turkish-Cypriot person being able to be elected leader of the entire island for in the future, simply must be resurrected. An official UN statement must read that the economic suffering of the Turkish Cypriots, who humbly agreed to a UN-suggested compromise, can no longer be tolerated by the international community. Certain economic or political ‘carrots’, or, incentives, should be offered by the EU to the relatively stubborn Greek government of Cyprus to be convinced to encourage the plan both to their public as well as the political leadership of Greece; certain ‘sticks’ must also be diplomatically threatened to them in case of non-compliance this time around, however, in order to ensure timely effectiveness, such as their decreased EU economic and decision-making, etc.

The United States and Britain should lead by example by holding good on their prior statements and temporarily recognize the Turkish half of the island in terms of trade until reunification, with the recognition that it must be brought up to par economically to avoid any financial or social ‘shocks’ in regards to EU standards upon future entry, such as one that happened with Germany’s reunification. The two countries, both with high standing in the world despite the failure of Iraq, must take charge where the EU likely won’t do on its own as it has already ignorantly accepted the divided island as a member-state which would be a difficult decision to ‘take back’, per say. Ban ki-Moon and his Special Representative to Cyprus, Michael Moller, should play the role of the main mediators in all the aforementioned processes; preferably, Moller could be replaced or aided by a non-EU official, as the Turks see EU-nationals as being naturally biased toward the ‘official’ Greek side. The intervention of a UN Secretary General came very close to resolving the dispute before, with Kofi Annan, being a person of international legitimacy with the necessary resources and accountability, as well as an ‘ally’ to both the Turkish and Greek sides which could allow for being perceived as neutral once again. The dispute resolution shall shun any political involvement from Greece and Turkey, with the exception of the troop-question if a balance of Greek and Turkish troops on the island, as I’ve suggested, is to be a potential selling point of the negotiation.

Tarik Oguzlu, from the IR Department of Bilkent University in Turkey, suggested as early as 2002 that a loosely-centralized and federal Cyprus is the only possible solution that could realistically work to reunify the island, and contended that the EU has the most potential to contribute to the island’s peace and security as any incentives it offers would directly interest the conflicting parties. Even then, Oguzlu was pointing out the negativity of the Greek government, which threatened to veto the EU enlargement process for Central and Eastern European countries if the EU denied accession to the Greek-Cypriots because of a continued stalemate, and the Turkish pride in warning that it would only interfere and integrate further with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus if the EU admitted the Greek-Cypriots as a member-state representing the whole island; lo and behold, the Greek threats ‘won’. He correctly predicted today’s situation when he stated that if the divided island was invited as a member without a resolution of the conflict, several regional crises could be expected with the most probable one pitting Turkey against the EU. “[This] stems from the dangers of the linkage politics between Turkey’s accession to the EU and the resolution of the Cyprus conflict…,” Oguzlu expressed. “The fear is that if Turkey were not encouraged enough on the way to its EU membership, it would not exert sustained pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to mend fences with the Greek Cypriots…[and]…Turkey’s relations with the EU would sour in the years to come, [worsening] the security climate in the region by alienating Turkey-a country that has
been playing a positive role in European security and stability for many years, from the EU-an international institution that claims to effectively play a global security role”.The EU has to now step up and take full responsibility by cooperating fully with any negotiation attempts between the two sides, even if neither the UN nor US and Britain have stepped up and taken the steps I’ve suggested by that time; after all, it must be recognized that Turkey humbly advocated for the Turkish-Cypriot side to support the Anna plan despite inside doubts over any benefits it would be bringing to either Northern Cyprus or Turkish entry into the EU.

Perhaps Oguzlu put it best when he expressed in the same 2002 article, “As the decision of the Serbians and Montenegrins to create a new state (Serbia and Montenegro) out of the ashes of Yugoslavia has demonstrated, the establishment of loosely centralized federal entities is the best possible answer to the question of how two adjacent communities with significant communal cleavages should live together..”It is true that Montenegro has since then become an independent state via a 2006 referendum, yet this should not become a source of paranoia for Europe, as Cyprus is as island nation consisting of relatively peaceful and fun-loving people. This is especially so with regards to Northern Cyprus- they don’t share such similarly adventurous ambitions of independence, nor do they feel a particularly nationalistic ‘closeness’ with Turkey. As one Turkish-Cypriot hotelier, who chose to remain anonymous, expressed to me personally during my 2008 trip to the island as a tourist, "The people here are only interested in living in the moment and enjoying their lives, not the politics. The main desire of many young people here in is getting the Turkish military out of the country so that the bases could be sold to the British (who are numerous in the country with many of them owning villa-style houses in this vacation region), so that they could use the money to purchase sport cars!"

References:
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30. *note: the new President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, since 2010, is Dervis Eroglu
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53. ‘Reuniting Cyprus’, Ibid
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55. ‘Talat, Christofias walking into minefield’, Yusuf Kanli, Turkish Daily News, March 21, 2008
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57. ‘Collapse of Cyprus Talks Delivers Another Blow to Turkey’s EU Ambitions’, Gareth Jenkins, Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 6, 2007
58. ‘What the dead have to say’, The Economist, April 19, 2008
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61. ‘The EU as an Actor in the Solution of the Cyprus Dispute: The Questions of ‘How’?’, H. Tarik Oguzlu, Journal on Ethno-politics and Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 2/2002
62. ‘The EU as an Actor in the Solution of the Cyprus Dispute: The Questions of ‘How’?’, Ibid.

Selin Senol, Alon Ben Meir's Negotiation Class, NYU-Global Affairs, May, 2008
Lightmillennium.Org, January 2011.